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Abstract 
Recovery of seasonal housing after disasters is driven by different types of decisions and resource 
streams than those of year-round homes. Given the importance of seasonal rentals in the economy 
of coastal and particularly island communities, understanding the levels and recovery trajectories 
of seasonal housing may inform overall recovery expectations. The authors report findings from 
an empirical study of impact and recovery trajectories for owner-occupied and rental single-family 
housing in housing sub-market areas in Galveston, Texas following Hurricane Ike using random 
effects panel models to predict the parcel-level values over an eight-year period.  Divergent impact 
and recovery trajectories and processes were found when comparing housing in residential markets 
with those in dynamic versus more languid vacation housing markets. Damage, tenure, minority 
population, and income all had significant effects on trajectories with varying direction and 
magnitudes across submarkets. These differences in the mechanisms of submarkets and 
vulnerability in recovery trajectories of coastal communities highlight the importance of mapping 
the influential factors in each area to target mitigation and recovery assistance effectively. 
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Introduction 
Through a comparative analysis of housing recovery across a variety of disasters in the United 
States (U.S.), Mary Comerio (1998) was one of the first researchers to explicitly examine the 
uneven rate of recovery among different forms of housing, noting that housing recovery policy in 
the United States, due to its focus on single-family owner-occupied housing, plays an important 
role in shaping these inequalities. Comerio drew the research community’s attention to different 
forms of housing as relevant factors when modeling housing recovery and informing or modifying 
policy alternatives to address uneven recovery rates. Since then, researchers have explored and 
documented many factors including damage, tenure, and social vulnerability elements such as 
race/ethnicity and income. Importantly, while post disaster planning for housing recovery has 
sometimes been discouraged (Peacock & Girard 1997), there is also a growing literature on the 
importance of planning for successful and equitable community recovery in general and for 
housing in particular (Van Zandt and Sloan, 2016; Olshansky, Hopkins, & Johnson, 2012; Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), 2011; Olshansky & Johnson, 2014; Smith, 2011). 
However, there is clear recognition that planning is falling short in addressing housing recovery 
beyond owner-occupied single-family (FEMA, 2009; Cantrell, Nahmens, Peavey, Bryant, & Stair, 
2012) and better understanding of differential patterns in housing recovery is needed (Zhang & 
Peacock, 2010; Peacock, Van Zandt, Zhang, & Highfield, 2014; Olshansky & Johnson, 2014).   
This work expands recent housing recovery research (e.g. Elliott & Pais, 2006; Elliott, Hite, & 
Devine, 2009; Zhang & Peacock, 2010; Stevenson, Emrich, Mitchell, & Cutter, 2010; Cutter, 
Schumann, & Emrich, 2014; Peacock et al., 2014) by examining damage and recovery trajectories 
for owner-occupied, rental, and vacation housing in a coastal community for an 8-year period 
3 
 
through a longitudinal impact-recovery model. Like many coastal communities, Galveston has a 
core area consisting of traditional residential housing, including owner-occupied and rental 
housing, as well as areas with high concentrations of vacation rentals and second homes. The 
following section reviews the housing recovery literature and introduces the potential significance 
of housing submarkets within coastal communities to better understand and capture inequalities in 
housing recovery trajectories. A discussion of Galveston and Hurricane Ike is then provided and 
the analysis strategy for modeling impact and recovery is introduced. Following the analysis and 
findings, the implications for recovery planning practice and research are discussed.  
Housing Recovery in Coastal Communities 
Each year hurricanes pose a significant threat to communities along the U.S. Gulf and Atlantic 
Coasts. The coastal environments of these communities can shape their economies, especially in 
terms of tourist activities, introducing unique features to their housing markets. While a 
conventional housing market consisting of typical owner-occupied and rental housing serves 
local residents, there is also the potential for a relatively large seasonal housing market. Among 
the approximately 5,000 communities located in National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA) defined coastal counties in Gulf and Atlantic coast states, the 2015 5-
year American Community Survey (ACS) data indicates that a quarter have vacancy rates of 
25% or more, with 40% or more of this housing devoted to seasonal-vacation housing. Seasonal 
housing is a mix of second/vacation homes, which can double as vacation rentals when not in use 
by owners, and full-time vacation rentals and timeshares. Vacation housing is often concentrated 
in areas with unique types of amenities and businesses, with little need for schools and with 
alternative factors shaping sales relative to traditional neighborhoods. Importantly, decisions to 
repair or rebuild after a disaster may differ for the owners or managers of second and seasonal 
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vacation homes compared to the owners of conventional housing, influenced in part by the 
differences in recovery resources available to finance rebuilding and repairs.   
Owner-occupants have a range of potential resources for repairs and rebuilding, comprising of 
personal or household savings, insurance, and loans, including low-interest Small Business 
Administration (SBA) loans, as well as safety-net programs such as minimum home repair under 
FEMA’s Individual and Household Program (IHP). Insurance can include private, specific 
hazard related insurance such as earthquake insurance, or special hazards related insurance such 
as semi-public/private state managed wind pools and the national flood insurance program. In 
recent years the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) has also developed a 
Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) Disaster Recovery Program which, if there is 
supplemental Congressional funding, can make available flexible grants to help fund private 
home repair and reconstruction (HUD, 2017; Gotham, 2014; Olshansky & Johnson, 2014).  
For the owners of vacation or second homes, the range of recovery sources is more limited. 
FEMA’s IHP is not available to address even their minimal repairs (FEMA, 2017; SBA, 2017b). 
These owners will depend on savings, insurance, and other loans including SBA (SBA 2017c). If 
a business receives an SBA loan, the loan is to replace the property, not for upgrading, with the 
exception of bringing the property up to existing building codes and mitigation to prevent future 
damage of up to 20% of the property’s value. In some cases, CDBG recovery funds may be 
available to address year-around rental housing (HUD, 2017c). The owners of rental properties, 
along with loan officers or financial backers, are making business decisions regarding anticipated 
future earnings versus the costs of repair or reconstruction. The nature of these decisions may 
differ based on target markets – seasonal tourists versus year-round residents – and the 
uncertainty of whether or not both will return. Within each of these target populations there are 
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various strata from low- to higher-income households that may modify the decision of 
owners/managers to repair/rebuild. For example, the literature suggests a tendency for the 
owners of year-round rentals, once repaired, to increase rents, targeting higher-income renters, 
perhaps in the hopes of recouping reinvestments more quickly (Quarantelli, 1982; Drabek & 
Key, 1984; Morrow & Peacock, 1997; Morrow & Enarson, 1997; Bolin & Stanford, 1998). Such 
decisions may reduce the availability of post-disaster rental housing for lower-income 
households (Peacock et al., 2014).  
The notion of submarkets, their importance for shaping and understanding a housing market, and 
their consequences for policy are not new. Megbolugbe et al. (1996:1780), in their discussion of 
Grigsby’s (1963) pioneering work, Housing Markets and Public Policy, noted that one of the 
primary reasons for publishing that research “was to alert planners and public officials that 
understanding the operation of housing markets must precede policy prescriptions for housing 
problems” a theme echoed by Glaeser (1996) and Bates (2006). Leishman, Costello, Rowley, & 
Watkins (2013), drawing on the work of Grigsby (1963), Maclennan (1982), and Watkins (2008) 
note that housing submarkets arise due to demand-side heterogeneity in preferences and supply-
side differences in housing stock. Furthermore, they and others have noted that understanding 
submarkets can improve the effectiveness of public policy and public sector expenditures, tax 
incentives, and private sector investments (Bates, 2006; Berry, McGreal, Stevenson, Young, & 
Webb, 2003; Goodman & Thibodeau, 2007; Rothenberg, Galster, Butler, & Pitkin, 1991; 
Schnare & Struyk, 1976). 
Given the importance of understanding housing submarkets for housing issues and policy in 
general, it is reasonable to suggest that submarkets may influence variations in housing recovery. 
Decisions to rebuild are shaped by homeowner preferences for staying in their homes and the 
6 
 
availability of resource streams for repair and rebuilding. This heterogeneous mix of preferences, 
rebuilding decisions, varying recovery resources, and uncertain demand suggest mixed recovery 
trajectories for owner and rental housing stocks between conventional versus seasonal housing 
submarkets. While not addressing submarkets explicitly, Cutter et al. (2014) used the percent of 
seasonal rentals at tract level, as an indicator of tenure when modeling individual house recovery 
following Hurricane Sandy. They concluded that housing in tracts with high percentages of 
seasonal/second homes recover more slowly during the first 6 months, but showed no 
consequence by a year after the storm. This paper directly assesses variations in impact and 
recovery between seasonal and more traditional housing markets.  
Models of housing recovery have found that other factors such as race/ethnicity and income have 
important implications for access to resources and can be related to another critical factor 
shaping recovery—levels of damage. Unsurprisingly, the level of damage sustained by homes 
has significant debilitating effects on both short and long-term recovery (Zhang & Peacock, 
2010; Peacock et al., 2014). However, damage levels are a function of the hazard agent itself and 
are related to housing conditions associated with housing type and tenure (Maly & Shiozaki, 
2012) neighborhood characteristics such as income and race/ethnicity (Bolin, 1982 & 1985; 
Bolin & Bolton, 1983 and 1986; Peacock & Girard, 1997; Van Zandt, Peacock, Henry, Grover, 
Highfield, & Brody, 2012; Gotham, 2014; Highfield, Peacock, & Van Zandt, 2014; Peacock et 
al., 2014). This relationship between high levels of damage and social vulnerability factors 
results from filtering (Grigsby, 1963; Myers, 1975) whereby older, lower valued, and poorer 
quality homes often house low-income and minority populations (Van Zandt et al., 2012; 
Peacock et al., 2014). Consequently, the physical and social concentration of damage sets the 
stage for very different recovery trajectories for housing in lower-income and minority 
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neighborhoods (Chang, 2010; Comerio, 1997; Green, Bates, & Smyth, 2007; Green & 
Olshansky, 2012; Zhang, 2012).  
The few systematic empirical studies on long-term housing recovery have found that rental 
housing, housing with higher levels of damage, and housing in low-income and minority 
neighborhoods have significantly slower recovery trajectories (Lu, Peacock, Zhang, & Dash  
2007a & 2007b; Zhang & Peacock, 2010; Peacock et al., 2014). One reason for such disparity is 
that the current disaster assistance programs in the U.S. continue to favor single-family 
homeowners (Bolin 1993; Comerio 1997 & 1998; Bolin and Stanford 1998). More recently, 
rental housing recovery was found to be slower after Katrina where assistance programs for 
landlords and renters appeared to be less aggressive (Vigdor, 2008). Since SBA loans are not 
grants, lower income areas are likely to be underserved by them (Kamel & Loukaitou-Sideris 
2004). Insurance generally favors higher income households, and insurance redlining can often 
leave minority households without sufficient insurance due to under-compensation or bankruptcy 
by marginal companies (Peacock & Girard, 1997; Scales, 2006; Bates & Green 2009). When 
analyzing recovery trajectories, these factors will be considered in the assessment of submarket 
consequences.  
Hurricane Ike and Galveston 
Hurricane Ike crossed between Galveston Island and Bolivar Peninsula (see Figure 1) on the 
morning of September 13, 2008 as a Category 2 storm, causing $29.5 billion in damage to the 
Houston-Galveston area, making it one of the costliest storms in U.S. history (Berg, 2009). 
Galveston’s core was protected by the seawall, erected after the deadly 1900 storm but it was 
nevertheless inundated from the bay side with 3 to 4.5 meter (10 to 15 feet) destructive waves. 
Damage to residential structures on Bolivar was three times higher than levels recorded on the  
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Figure 1- Vacation homes by census tract 
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island. Residential damage was more variable on the island, with higher levels occurring outside 
the seawall and among homes closer to the bay side (Highfield et al., 2014).  
The 16-kilometer (10-mile) long, 5-meter (17 feet) high seawall has not only protected 
residential structures on Galveston during many storms, it has also shaped development and 
ultimately residential versus seasonal housing markets. The vast majority of Galveston’s 
residential housing has historically been and remains behind the seawall in its urban core. Yet 
increasing development pressures, particularly for vacation housing, has expanded development 
outside the seawall toward what is termed the East and particularly the West ends of the island. 
Tourism related to its beaches and Galveston’s historic homes, seawall, and business district (the 
Strand) is its fastest growing industry (Angelou Economics, 2008; Gulf & South Atlantic 
Fisheries Foundation, 2010). Despite the higher risks of storm damage and constant erosion on 
the West End beyond the seawall, the city has subsidized development through tax-increment 
reinvestment zones and creating a favorable environment for builders/developers (Beeton, 2008). 
Development on Bolivar Peninsula has been much more limited historically due to its relative 
isolation and dependence on ferry service from Galveston Island. 
The housing market literature has for long debated how best to measure housing markets and 
submarkets (Bates, 2006; Bourassa, Hamelink, Hoesli, & MacGregor , 1999) ranging from 
segmentation assessments based on housing attributes such as price or size (Goodman & 
Thibodeau, 2007; Adair, Berry, & McGreal, 1996; Plam, 1978), population or demand attributes 
such as race or income (Schnare & Struyk, 1976; Adair et al., 1996; Palm, 1978; Watkins, 2001), 
to spatial assessments based on census units, zip codes, or physical boundaries (Bourassa, 
Hoesli, & Peng, 2003; Goodman & Thibodeau, 2003, 2007), or combinations of these (Tu, 1997; 
Watkins, 2001).  For this research the issue is to identify areas where traditional residential 
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versus seasonal housing are dominant enough to assert their salience in shaping rebuilding 
decisions and recovery resources. To identify these submarkets in Galveston, ACS tract data for 
2005-2009 were employed. These ACS period data are less than optimal because 15 of the 60 
months fall after Hurricane Ike. Unfortunately, three-year estimates for 2005-07 are not available 
at the tract or smaller census unit level. Hence, the 2005-09 data are the only available data near 
the period of interest, 75% of the data for this period were collected prior to Ike and they provide 
the finest resolution data for capturing housing market variations of interest. There are 23 tracts 
on Galveston Island and Bolivar Peninsula and four had high concentrations of 50% or more of 
vacant housing devoted to seasonal, recreational, or occasional use. These tracts are consistent 
with locally-identified vacation areas on Galveston Island, the West End (two tracts) and the East 
End (one tract), and the Bolivar peninsula (one tract). As shown in Figure 1, all vacation areas 
are outside the urban core and its seawall.  
Table 1 displays housing unit characteristics for these areas. The urban core includes a majority, 
73.0%, of Galveston’s housing units with 33.3% single-family owner-occupied and a mixture of 
single-family, duplexes, and multifamily devoted to rental housing at 41.9%. The remaining, 
24.9%, is vacant, with the majority for rent or sale or transitioning between renters or owners, 
and only 16.8% for seasonal vacation use. The only similarity between the urban core and the 
island’s vacation area is that 30.0% of housing is owner-occupied. However, only 15.4% is rental 
in the island’s seasonal vacation area with the majority, 55%, of housing vacant and over 72.1% 
of this vacant housing is for seasonal vacation use. The average median value of owner-occupied 
housing in the urban core is $122000 ($122K), while in the island vacation area it is higher at 
$178K.  There are important variations in house age, reflecting differences in building codes, 
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standards, and location that correspond to hazard vulnerability between these markets as well 
(for a detailed explanation, see Highfield et al., 2014). 
The researchers identified two distinct seasonal vacation markets in the study area. The seasonal 
vacation housing submarket on Galveston Island is more dynamic, upscale, and has experienced 
more recent growth, while Bolivar’s is more isolated, has experienced limited growth and is less 
affluent. Both of these areas contrast to the more historical and yet conventional residential 
housing market in the urban core.  
Research question and hypotheses 
The primary question motivating this research is whether the specification of residential versus 
vacation housing submarkets improves the performance of impact-recovery models for 
Galveston following Hurricane Ike. Based on the literature, there are clear expectations with 
respect to housing impact and recovery:  
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Higher degrees of damage will slow recovery; 
H2: Owner-occupied housing will suffer less damage; 
H3: Owner-occupied housing will recover more quickly; 
H4: Housing in higher income neighborhoods will suffer less damage; 
H5: Housing in higher income neighborhoods will recover more quickly; 
H6: Housing in neighborhoods with higher minority (Hispanic and non-Hispanic Black) 
concentrations will suffer more damage. 
H7: Housing in neighborhoods with higher minority (Hispanic and non-Hispanic Black) 
concentrations will recover more slowly. 
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Data and Analytical Approach 
Annual tax assessments for single-family residential structures in Galveston Island and Bolivar 
Peninsula provide the data for this research. An established literature justifies the use of property 
assessments to track damage and recovery (Bin & Kruse, 2006; De Silva, Kruse, & Wang 2006; 
Fujita, 1989; Knaap, 1998; Peacock et al., 2014; Zhang & Peacock, 2010), but this is the first 
time that an 8-year panel from pre-impact, 2008, through impact, 2009, and recovery years, 
2010-2015, has been used to assess long-term recovery. Previous long-term recovery models 
have only provided 3 years of post-impact data, which was insufficient for many structures to 
reach restoration levels (Peacock et al., 2014; Zhang & Peacock, 2010). It may appear confusing 
that 2008 data is the year prior to Hurricane Ike, which hit in mid-September of 2008. Tax 
appraisals are generally undertaken during the first two quarters of the year and then made 
official at the end of the year. Hence the 2008 assessment reflects the value of structures 
generally during the first half to three quarters of 2008, prior to any damage caused by Ike. The 
2009 assessment captures the deflated value of homes impacted by Ike. Given that owners were 
paying property taxes on undamaged structures in 2008, the Galveston appraisal office took steps 
to inspect structures so that assessments would capture damage, as well as potential repairs, 
rebuilding, and improvements. Nevertheless, given the timing of appraisals, the assessments are 
only an approximate assessment of damage and recovery measures. Only single-family structures 
are employed in this analysis because the data on multifamily structures was incomplete in terms 
of the number of units in the structure, which therefore precludes an accurate analysis of 
recovery for different forms of multi-family structures.  
Parcel data provide information on house characteristics such as year built, size, and occupancy. 
Owner-occupancy is based on the homestead exemption, which can only be taken on the primary 
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residence. Structures without a homestead exemption include rentals and second homes. Since 
parcel data does not provide data on household characteristics, each house is linked to its block 
group location and assigned 2005-2009 five-year ACS data capturing neighborhood socio-
demographic attributes – median household income, percent Hispanic, and non-Hispanic Black. 
The final dataset includes 186,280 observations comprising 23,285 single-family houses (12,236 
(52.5%) urban core, 6,033 (25.9%) Galveston vacation area, and 5,016 (21.5%) Bolivar vacation 
market) with eight points in time for each structure.  
The analysis strategy employed in this research develops statistical models predicting the 
changing assessed values of single-family homes from a baseline (2008) year, just prior to the 
hurricane’s potential impact, through impact (2009), and into post-impact or what is generally 
referred to as the recovery period (2010-15). Hence, the authors refer to the present models as 
impact-recovery models because they model housing from an initial pre-impact state, through 
impact, and into a “recovery” period. Specifically, the researchers employ random effects panel 
models predicting the natural log of assessed values for each structure over an eight-year period. 
The theoretical literature posits and the empirical literature has found that a number of time-
invariant factors (i.e., social vulnerability and socioeconomic factors) across residential parcels 
have influence on disaster impact and recovery. Random effects models allow for the inclusion 
and assessment of both time invariant and variant factors and hence are employed for this 
analysis. The basic impact-recovery model is specified as follows:  
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + �𝛿𝛿𝑇𝑇𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7
𝑇𝑇=1
+ �𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + �𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4
𝑗𝑗=1
2
𝑘𝑘=1
 
   [1] 
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Where lnHVit is the natural log of assessed value for each single-family house i for each year t. 
The intercept, β0 is the estimated average logged structure value in the base year, 2008, when 
other variables, are at zero and Yrit is a series of seven dummy variables for each year following 
the base year. Hence, 𝛿𝛿𝑇𝑇 represents the difference in the average structure value from the base 
year, controlling for other factors, through the impact and recovery period. 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 represents two 
control variables (house age and size) and 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘 captures their effects, net of other factors, where 
age is anticipated to have a negative effect and size a positive effect. Dmit is relative damage, the 
percent assessed value loss due to Ike’s impact, and its coefficient, 𝛽𝛽3, captures the effect of 
damage. Xit represents four key independent variables (owner-occupied dummy, median income, 
percent Hispanic, and percent non-Hispanic Black) and the 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗’s represent their individual effects, 
while 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a composite error term. In addition to the base model, a more elaborate random 
effects model is employed that allows the effects of the key independent variables to vary 
through time as follows:  
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + �𝛿𝛿𝑇𝑇𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7
𝑇𝑇=2
+ �𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2
𝑘𝑘=1
+ �𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + �𝛿𝛿𝑇𝑇(𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)7
𝑇𝑇=3
+ �𝛿𝛿𝑇𝑇(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)7
𝑇𝑇=2
+ 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4
𝑗𝑗=1
 
[2] 
This equation has two sets of interaction terms, in which the damage measure, Dmit, and the four 
additional key independent variables, Xit’s, are multiplied by year dummy variables. Since 
damage is not registered until 2009, there are interaction terms for six years, but for the other key 
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independent variables interactions change for seven years. Hence the 𝛿𝛿𝑇𝑇 coefficients capture the 
net difference in the effects of damage through the recovery period and of other independent 
variables through the impact and recovery period over their base effects.  
Analysis and Findings  
The first phase in the analysis determined if individual submarket models (i.e., separate panel 
models for housing in each submarket) perform better than a pooled model (i.e., a single model 
with housing from all submarkets combined). A two-step process was employed. Because of 
space limitations, the models estimated for each step is not presented in the paper, rather their 
results are discussed. First, two indicator (dummy) variables one for urban core (1 if urban core, 
0 otherwise) and the other for Bolivar (1 if Bolivar, 0 otherwise) houses, with island vacation 
areas as the reference category, were added to the models. Tests for improvement in model 
performance were significant in both cases (For Model 1 the test for adding the two indicator 
submarket variables was Wald = 1587.30, p ≤ .0001 and for Model 2 the test was Wald 
=1905.13, p ≤ .0001).  Having confirmed initial submarket differences, the second step added 
interaction terms between submarket indicators and key independent variables in both models. 
The test results were again significant (Model 1: Wald = 37838.68, p ≤ .0001; Model 2: Wald = 
250000, p ≤ .0001), indicating that the effects of the independent variables and hence, the 
processes, varied significantly among submarkets, justifying employing separate submarket 
impact-recovery models.  
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for each submarket area. As expected housing in the 
island’s vacation area is much younger, 17.7 years compared to the older housing in the urban 
core averaging 32 years, with Bolivar falling in-between at 21.3 years. Average housing sizes are 
largest in the island vacation areas, followed by the urban core, and relatively small on Bolivar. 
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Notably, owner-occupancy of single-family houses is only 22.6% on Bolivar, 29.4% in the island 
vacation area, but over 58% in the urban core. The variations in damage are dramatic. Housing in 
the island vacation area lost on average 22% of its pre-Ike assessment and 33% in the urban core, 
but a devastating 72.8% on Bolivar. Not surprisingly, given the aforementioned, median income 
for the island vacation area was $56.7K, followed by the urban core at $38.7K and Bolivar at 
$33.3K. The urban core’s neighborhoods are much more diverse with an average of 31.4% 
Hispanic and 18.4% non-Hispanic Black, while vacation areas are overwhelmingly Anglo, 
particularly on Bolivar.  
Table 3 presents Models 1 and 2 results for each submarket. These random effects panel models 
are estimated using generalized least squares (GLS) with robust standard errors to address issues 
of heteroskedasticity and serial auto-correlation. Both models in each set are statistically 
significant, and tests comparing base and interactive models were significant across all sets, 
indicating that, as a whole, the effects of key variables change significantly through the damage 
and recovery periods. The year interaction coefficients capture net changes over baseline effects, 
but must be combined with base coefficient to capture the overall effects for specific years. 
While significance test for interaction coefficients assess its significance from zero, the 
combined effects (baseline + net) were tested for significance employing a Wald test. In light of 
these test results, the discussion focuses on similarities and differences revealed by the 
interactive models across submarkets and the base models are provided for reference.  
The Impact of Damage Is Significant and Long Lasting 
The effects of damage are profoundly significant across all areas, but particularly hard hitting for 
housing on Bolivar, given the nature of the storm The base damage coefficients indicate that 
every percentage point in damage resulted in appraised values falling -3.2% among houses in the 
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urban core, -5.6% in the island’s vacation area, and -11.6% on Bolivar. (Note, rather than using 
rule-of-thumb conversions for semi-elasticities (100*β), mathematically correct conversions, 
(100*(eβx – 1)), are employed throughout our discussions.) The negative consequences continued 
throughout the recovery years in all areas, but patterns were different. In both the urban core and 
Bolivar, the year-damage interaction coefficients are positive and growing larger, which, when 
combined with base effect, indicates the consequences of damage are lessening as recovery 
proceeds. For example, by the seventh year after the storm on Bolivar, the combined effect of 
damage was -7.9% (or 100*(e (-.1232 + .0414)-1) for every percentage point of damage and for 
housing in the urban core the combined effect was -1.76% (or 100*(e (-.0324 + .0147)-1). For housing 
in Galveston island’s vacation areas however, most of the damage-year interaction coefficients 
are negative, but non-significant, indicating that the negative effects of damage remain more or 
less constant, ranging between -5.63% to -6.13% and ending, by the seventh year, at -5.83% for 
every percentage point of damage suffered by the house. Thus, while the patterns are different, 
the effects of damage were profound for housing across all areas, particularly on the Bolivar 
peninsula, and the consequences continue to be felt seven years after Ike with more severely 
damaged homes experiencing greater difficulty reaching restoration levels. These findings are 
consistent with hypothesis 1.  
Owner-occupied Housing Suffered Less Damage and Recovered More Quickly  
An interesting, but not surprising pattern is evidenced by the baseline owner-occupied 
coefficient; owner-occupied housing was appraised significantly higher in the urban core (14.6% 
higher) and on Bolivar (8.1%), but significantly lower (-6.7%) in island vacation areas than non-
owner-occupied housing. This probably reflects the relatively rapid, more recent growth of 
costlier vacation-seasonal housing in island vacation areas. Hypothesis 2 indicates that owner-
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occupied housing should have retained larger portions of pre-Ike value, indicating less damage; 
the results for the urban core and island vacation areas are consistent with this expectation. 
Specifically, the first owner-occupied-year interaction term is positive and significant in the 
urban core model indicating a net increase (retention given this was the damage impact year) of 
just over 7%, yielding a combined positive differential for owner-occupied housing of 22.7%. 
Among island vacation owner-occupied housing the negative baseline value is reversed by the 
significant, positive first interaction coefficient, indicating that owner-occupied housing in this 
area was valued at 4.5% higher after impact. Perhaps because of the catastrophic damage 
registered among all housing in Bolivar, the first interaction term for owner-occupied housing 
was not significant, indicating that while owner-occupied housing is still valued higher than 
other housing, it did not disproportionately retain value above other housing.  
In light of recovery policy favoring owner-occupied housing, hypothesis 3 suggests that owner-
occupied housing should move more rapidly toward recovery, a pattern consistent in the urban 
core and Bolivar, and while not as pronounced among homes in island vacation areas, also held 
there at least initially in the recovery process. In the urban core, the owner-time interaction terms 
are consistently significant, positive, and generally increasing indicating an increasing gap as 
owner-occupied housing substantially recovered faster relative to other forms of housing. Indeed, 
in the impact year owner-occupied housing in the core is 22.7% higher than other housing, grows 
to 27.8% two years after, 33.3% four years after, and is 38.4% higher by the sixth year and 
maintain that differential in the last year. There is a delay among Bolivar’s owner-occupied 
houses, in that it is not until the fourth year after Ike that differentials are registered. However, by 
the fourth year, the combined effect has owner-occupied housing valued at 42.2% higher than 
other housing, growing to 56.4% by year-6 and ending at 54% by year-7. In island vacation areas 
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owner occupied housing makes a significant positive jump of 4.5% (or 100*(e (-0.0691733 + 0.1136285)-
1) above other housing in the first recovery year, particularly given the negative baseline value,  
but this gain appears to dissipate the next year. In the third year after Ike owner-occupied homes 
were again valued 7.5% higher than other housing, but this differential too dissipates in the 
remaining years. Nevertheless, owner-occupied housing does make gains relative to other 
housing in the recovery period in Island vacation areas and never again goes below valuations of 
other types of housing during the recovery period following Ike. On the whole, these results are 
consistent with hypothesis 3. 
The Impacts of Neighborhood Income Are Consistent with Expectations in Traditional 
Residential Areas, but Divergent in Vacation Home Areas  
In the urban core, in the base year assessed values of houses in higher income neighborhoods 
were higher. The significant positive base year coefficient indicates that assessments were .25% 
higher per $1,000 in median household income. The significant positive income-year 1 
interaction indicates that, consistent with hypothesis 4, housing in higher income neighborhoods 
retained an additional .34% of their value per thousand dollars, meaning they experienced 
significantly less damage than homes in lower income areas. Consistent with hypothesis 5, the 
significant and positive income-year coefficients throughout the recovery period indicate higher 
recovery rates for housing in higher income neighborhoods. These gains are particularly strong 
through the third year after Ike, where the combined effect is .84% per thousand dollars; they 
remain relatively stable the 4th-6th years and by the seventh year assessed values were .71% 
higher per thousand dollars in median household income.  
The income effects are completely different in the island and Bolivar vacation areas. While the 
baseline coefficient is non-significant_ indicating that housing values are not dependent on 
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neighborhood income prior to Ike in island vacation areas_ the significant negative income-year 
1 interaction indicates that housing in higher income neighborhoods suffered greater relative 
damage. Furthermore, all subsequent interaction terms are significant and negative, indicating 
that housing in richer neighborhoods was slower in the recovery process. The negative combined 
effect of income increased steadily peaking in the fifth year after Ike, at -1.2% per thousand and 
remained essentially stable afterward. A similar, but stronger pattern is evident on Bolivar. The 
baseline coefficient indicates that assessments were lower, at -4.8% per $1,000 in median income 
and the gap widened considerably in the impact year, with the combined effect rising to -25.9% 
(or 100*(e (-.0493 -0.250)-1)) per $1,000. In the subsequent years this differential grew rapidly 
reaching -54.0% per $1,000, by the seventh year. These findings suggest that housing in 
wealthier neighborhoods of predominantly vacation areas suffered more damage and their 
recovery progressed more slowly. Clearly, the results for the urban core are consistent with the 
expectations of hypotheses 4 and 5, however the results for the island vacation area and 
particularly for Bolivar are not.  
The findings for Neighborhood Minority Composition Are Mixed with Respect to Expectations 
across Submarket Areas  
As would be expected given the housing literature, single-family housing in traditional 
residential urban core neighborhoods with higher percentages of minority populations had lower 
assessed values. Baseline coefficients indicate that assessments were -0.44% and -0.60% lower 
for every percentage point increase in neighborhood Hispanic and non-Hispanic Black 
population respectively. However, unexpectedly subsequent Black and Hispanic year interaction 
terms are all significant and positive indicating that minority areas did not suffer disproportionate 
losses nor did they experience relatively slower recovery trajectories. The net effects however 
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result in somewhat divergent patterns. With respect to non-Hispanic Black composition, the 
positive Black-year interaction terms consistently cancel-out the negative baseline effect, 
indicating no differentials in damage or recovery associated with non-Hispanic Black 
neighborhood composition. In other words, housing located in neighborhoods with higher 
concentrations of non-Hispanic Blacks, did not suffer higher levels of damage nor experienced 
slower recovery rates in Galveston’s urban core. Indeed, initial differences in housing 
assessments due to non-Hispanic Black composition are not evident throughout the recovery 
period, although a marginally significant negative combined effect (-.18%) in 2015 suggest that 
racial differences might be reemerging. Houses in neighborhoods with higher proportions of 
Hispanics suffered less relative damage as well. The significant Hispanic-year1 coefficient 
suggests a reduction of the initial baseline differential in assessments associated with 
neighborhood Hispanic composition; hence, less relative losses for housing in these areas. 
Indeed, the combined significant effect of the Hispanic baseline and Hispanic-year1 interaction 
suggests a -.14% (or 100*(e (-.0044 + .0030)-1)) drop in assessed values for every percentage point 
increase in Hispanic population in the impact year. This is significantly less than the initial 
baseline differential of -.44% per percentage point. Additionally, the positive Hispanic-year 
interaction terms for year-2 through year-7 indicate that housing in neighborhoods with higher 
concentrations of Hispanics made net gains, indicating relatively higher recovery rates. However, 
the positive Hispanic-year interaction coefficients do not cancel out the initial negative baseline 
effect in post-Ike years two, four, six, and seven, yielding significant negative combined effects 
ranging from -0.08% to -0.13% per percentage Hispanic. While relatively small, given high 
concentrations of Hispanics in some neighborhoods, these differentials could represent as much 
as a 10% lower assessment value.  Thus, despite the continued lower assessments in 
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neighborhoods with higher concentrations of Hispanics, on the whole, the authors did not see 
higher relative losses or slower recovery rates for areas with higher concentrations of minorities 
in Galveston’s traditional housing market, the urban core. In the urban core, the findings are not 
supportive of Hypotheses 6 or 7. 
The effects of minority populations are mixed in vacation home areas of Galveston Island and 
Bolivar. In the island’s vacation area, the baseline coefficient for Hispanic is not significant, 
indicating no initial differences in the assessments of housing associated with higher 
concentration of Hispanics. Additionally, the significant, positive Hispanic-year interaction 
coefficients through the impact and recovery period again indicates that single-family houses in 
Hispanic neighborhoods experienced smaller relative losses and fared better during recovery. 
Indeed, by the seventh year the significant combined effect indicates that housing is assessed at 
4.5% (100*(e (.0006 + .0437)-1)) higher per percentage point of Hispanic population in Galveston 
island’s vacation neighborhoods. A very different picture emerges for non-Hispanic Black 
composition. The significant baseline Black coefficient is negative, indicating that housing 
assessments were -1.1% lower with every percentage point of non-Hispanic Black in the island 
vacation neighborhoods. These houses also lost disproportionally due to Ike’s impact, falling an 
additional -2.2% per percentage point Black population, yielding a combined effect of -3.3% in 
the impact year. Furthermore housing recovery was slower consistently falling behind. For the 
first three recovery years the combined deficient was significant at -5.3% per percentage point 
ending at -4.8% per non-Hispanic Black percentage in 2015. Clearly, the results for Galveston 
island’s vacation neighborhoods with higher concentrations of non-Hispanic Black populations is 
consistent with hypotheses 6 and 7, while those for Hispanic neighborhoods are not. 
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Bolivar has no Black population, nonetheless the finding for neighborhoods with higher 
concentrations of Hispanics are inconsistent with hypothesis 6, but consistent with 7. On Bolivar, 
houses in neighborhoods with higher Hispanic percentages had slightly lower values before Ike 
with assessments a -.81% per percentage point of Hispanics. However, the significant Hispanic-
year1 interaction coefficient indicates that houses in these neighborhoods suffered significantly 
lower relative damage generating a surprisingly positive combined effect of 3.4% (100*(e (-
.0081+.0411)-1)) for every percentage point Hispanic. However, with the exception of the second 
year after Ike, all subsequent Hispanic-time interaction terms are negative and significant, 
indicating slower recovery. Indeed, by year 3 (2010), the combined negative effects were -2.4% 
(100*(e (-.0081 - 0.0159)-1)) and became significantly more negative reaching a maximum of -7.5% 
(100*(e (-0.0081 - 0.0701)-1)) by 2015. On Bolivar the findings are therefore inconsistent with respect 
to Hypothesis 6, but supportive of Hypothesis 7. 
Discussion  
The picture that emerges from the single-family housing impact-recovery analyses for Galveston’s 
residential and vacation areas is far from simple. There clearly are quite divergent impacts and 
recovery trajectories when comparing housing in Galveston’s traditional residential market with 
those of the more dynamic vacation area on Galveston Island and Bolivar’s more staid (slower 
growing and older housing) vacation area. To facilitate discussion, the findings with respect to the 
hypotheses are summarized in Table 4 and a series of figures are offered to facilitate a visual 
interpretation of some results. The figures present predicted results derived from the full models 
computed by employing mean values for housing in each sub-market area (see Table 2) and a set 
of relevant values for variables under consideration. To further ease interpretation and comparison 
across areas and through time, predicted values were exponentiated and indexed relative to 
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predicted baseline values (2008). Hence, trajectory plots begin at 1; values below 1 indicate 
assessments below 2008 values reflecting loss or failure to recover, values at 1 reflect restoration 
to baseline assessments, and values above 1 reflect recovery or gains above restoration levels.  
As noted above, damage had significant, long-lasting negative consequences and the findings were 
consistent with H1 across all areas (see Table 4, first row). However, the magnitudes were quite 
varied with profound, long-lasting negative consequences in Bolivar, lower but still substantial 
negative consequences for housing in island vacation areas, and even lower, diminishing, but still 
significantly negative consequences in the urban core. The consequences and differences are 
clearly evident in the trajectory lines for three levels of damage (30%, 60%, and 90%) in each area 
presented in Figure 2. Comparing the drops for respective damage levels across each area, it is 
clear that there are steeper drops in the vacation areas and these areas don’t see the rapid positive 
bounces seen in the urban core in 2010. Indeed, housing suffering 30% damage levels in the core 
reach restoration levels by 2012. These differences may well reflect the very different array and 
levels of recovery resources open to more traditional residential homes dominating the urban core, 
versus seasonal, second, and occasional housing dominating vacation areas. The nature of the 
decisions to repair and rebuild for these different forms of housing, particularly with much higher 
levels of damage may also be playing a role in the very flat trajectories for severely damaged 
structures in vacation areas as well. It should be noted that while these damage levels were present 
in all areas, as seen in Table 2, the average damage levels were actually much lower among island 
vacation housing (22.6%), hence the typical trajectories are shallower and reach restoration levels 
more quickly. On the other hand, the average damage levels on Bolivar (72.8%) fell between the 
60% and 90% levels; hence, the dramatic steep falls and flat trajectories were much more 
characteristic of a typical residential neighborhood.  
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Figure 2- Impact-Recovery Trajectories by Damage Levels 
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Hypotheses with respect to owner-occupied houses (rows 2 and 3, Table 4) suffering less damage 
(H2) and recovering more quickly (H3) net of other factors, were supported, with the exception of 
damage differentials among Bolivar’s single-family housing. This exception is likely due to the 
devastating levels of damage experienced by all housing on the peninsula. The panels in Figure 3, 
clearly capture the damage differentials in the urban core and island vacation areas. The differential 
recovery trajectories are most easily seen in both the urban core and island vacation areas, where 
owner-occupied housing rebounds much more quickly, with the growing gap particularly evident 
in the urban core. The significant gap in recovery trajectories are even evident in the Bolivar 
vacation area despite the devastation experienced there.  
In addition to the different consequences of damage seen between Galveston’s residential housing 
in the urban core compared to housing in vacation areas, the findings with respect to neighborhood 
income were also different. As seen in Table 4, hypothesized expectations for housing in higher 
income neighborhoods to suffer less damage (H4) and recover more quickly (H5) found strong 
support in the urban core, but were rejected in both vacation areas. Figure 4 displays the impact-
recovery trajectories for housing in neighborhoods varying by median household income for each 
area. The income ranges were limited for Bolivar; consequently, only two sets of predicted values, 
at 30K and 35K, are presented, along with the more extend ranges possible in urban core and island 
vacation areas. The differences are most evident when comparing housing in urban core versus 
island vacation areas. In the urban core, the upper trend line reflecting lower impact and more 
rapid and higher levels of recovery is for housing in higher median income (70K) neighborhoods, 
while the lowest line representing higher impact, and the slowest and lowest levels of recovery is 
for housing in the lowest median income (30K) neighborhoods. The other lines fall between these 
extremes in order. However, in island vacation areas, the trend lines appear in opposite order.  
27 
 
Figure 3- Damage-Recovery Trajectories for Owner-Occupied vs. Other Single Family Housing 
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Figure 4- Impact-Recovery Trajectories by Neighborhood Median Household Income 
   
29 
 
Housing in the lowest income neighborhoods (30K) are represented by the upper trend line, and 
remaining trend lines fall in opposite order with housing in highest median income areas (70K) 
suffering higher impacts and recovering slower and at lower levels. While only two sets of 
predictions were possible for Bolivar, similar to island vacation areas, the upper trend line is for 
housing in the lowest median income level (30K). Tests for non-linear income effects that may 
have accounted for this reversal were not significant. 
Two plausible explanations for the opposite findings with respect to income might be related to 
Galveston’s unique development patterns between its urban core and vacation areas and a 
specification issue stemming from using census data to capture household characteristics. 
Galveston, as noted above, has more or less clearly defined residential and vacation areas. The 
former is located in the historical core of the community, to a large extent behind its historic 
seawall, with historic and higher income housing located on land elevated behind and closer to the 
seawall. Many lower income areas are located closer to the bay side of the island that were not as 
elevated and were subject to higher levels of flooding as Ike’s surge came around the island from 
the bay side. Hence, these factors result in higher income areas experiencing less damage, and 
given normal recovery processes for single-family housing, homes in higher income areas 
recovered more quickly. In vacation areas, on the other hand, the goal is to have vacation and 
second homes as close to the coast as possible, which means higher valued properties potentially 
with a few wealthier year-round residents were more vulnerable to and suffered higher levels of 
damage. Housing more distant from the water may well be lower valued and more likely occupied 
by lower income year-around residents. Hence, the negative relationship with respect to damage 
implies higher recovery levels for lower income areas, assuming that higher owner occupancy 
rates means greater access to recovery resources and quicker decisions to rebuild/repair. It is 
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possible that the negative findings for Galveston’s vacation areas are partially a function of 
employing census data to, in part, capture the household characteristics of housing occupants. In 
the urban core, census data is likely to better capture the characteristics of full time residents (both 
renters and owners), while in vacation areas, the correlation is more tenuous because the actual 
owners of vacation and second homes are not full time residents that would be included in census 
data. For example, the correlation between appraised housing value and median household income 
was .37 in the urban core but only .09 in island vacation areas, suggesting this more tenuous 
relationship between census data and actual occupants/owners of housing in these areas. Future 
research utilizing primary data on household income, structure specific data on vacation or 
secondary home status, along with detailed data on proximity to coast and actual flood depths can 
perhaps address this issues. For now, the theoretical expectations of a negative relationship 
between income and impact and a positive relationship between income and recovery only found 
support in traditional residential areas where year around community residents are likely to be the 
majority. What is equally clear, however, is that widely different impact and recovery patterns are 
evident with respect to income when comparing housing located in residential versus vacation 
areas. 
The findings with respect to neighborhood minority concentrations among Galveston’s housing 
submarkets were perhaps the most surprising and unexpected. The expectations were that 
housing in neighborhoods with higher minority concentrations would suffer higher levels of 
damage (H6) and would recover more slowly (H7). Since the authors examined minority 
concentrations for both Hispanic and non-Hispanic Black composition, the findings for each are 
presented separately as a set of rows. The results are mixed at best, but on the whole the finding 
for Hispanic concentrations are strongly negative with respect to the hypotheses, and the fact that 
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hypotheses for both Hispanic and non-Hispanic Blacks are rejected for housing in Galveston’s 
residential urban core is also a strong negative finding. Figure 5 employs a set of Hispanic 
concentrations common to all three areas. In both the urban core and island vacation areas, 
housing in neighborhoods with higher Hispanic concentrations suffered less damage and 
displayed steeper more positive recovery trajectories. The only finding consistent with the 
hypothesized expectations for Hispanic concentrations is found in the recovery trajectories on 
Bolivar, where housing in areas with lower Hispanic concentrations performed significantly 
better, but that is against a context of simply very, very limited recovery for all housing on 
Bolivar in the first place. Figure 6 also employs a common set of non-Hispanic Black 
concentrations for the urban core and island vacation areas. The results for housing in the urban 
core, again, run completely counter to the hypotheses in that housing in neighborhoods with 
higher concentrations of non-Hispanic Blacks suffered lower impacts and display stronger and 
more positive recovery trajectories. These patterns are however, reverse among housing in island 
vacation areas where neighborhoods with higher non-Hispanic Blacks suffered 
disproportionately more negative impacts and display very shallow, almost flat “recovery” 
trajectories until 2013 or 2014.   
The rejection of hypotheses for both Hispanic and non-Hispanic Black neighborhood 
composition factors in Galveston’s more traditional urban core residential area is particularly 
intriguing because it runs counter to the literature that has generally focused on typical 
residential housing markets, not the special case of vacation housing markets. It should be noted 
that interaction effects between income and neighborhood minority composition, attempting to 
account for the unanticipated findings with respect to income and minority composition were 
explored, but did not prove fruitful. Another factor is related to the highly significant, negative,  
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Figure 5- Impact-Recovery Trajectories by Neighborhood Hispanic Composition 
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Figure 6-  Impact-Recovery Trajectories by Neighborhood non-Hispanic Black Composition 
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and long lasting consequences of damage and the resulting relatively flat recovery trajectories 
found throughout the examples displayed in Figures 2-6. In other research that quantitatively 
examines housing recovery, the trajectories are generally steeper, suggesting trends that are more 
consistent with expectations that housing will recover in 2 to 5 years (Bin & Kruse, 2006; De 
Silva, Kruse, & Wang 2006; Zhang & Peacock 2010). However in this research, trajectories 
reflect a much longer recovery period clearly indicating low levels of reinvestment for the 
rebuilding and repairs necessary for robust housing recovery. This is perhaps due to the fact that 
Ike struck in 2008, the peak of our nation’s economic meltdown, but the authors also know that 
many households reported having difficulties obtaining insurance settlements because of 
disagreement as to whether damage was wind or flood related (Hamideh, 2015). Survey work 
also suggests that 50% of homeowners did not have flood insurance and many houses had to be 
elevated to meet flood requirements, substantially adding to rebuilding costs (Van Zandt et al, 
2012; Peacock et al 2014 and 2017). The city was able to obtain CDBG-Recovery funding, 
which must partially target low income households and areas, to directly help homeowners and 
some rental properties rebuild. The literature also suggests that social capital can be important 
for long-term housing recovery particularly in the context of relatively low economic capital 
(Aldrich and Meyer 2015; Aldrich 2012). It may well be that these factors have helped shape the 
unanticipated findings with respect to both the minority composition and income in the post-Ike 
housing recovery process. 
The discussion above clearly points to fruitful areas of future research and a major limitation in 
this study as well as most recovery research to date. To more fully understand recovery in 
general and housing recovery in particular there is a need to move beyond single case study 
events and develop relatively large longitudinal datasets that include individual/household level 
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data on recovery resources such as inputs from private and public insurance, aid, grants, and 
loans from federal, state, and local sources, as well as inputs from social networks (Peacock et 
al., 2008). Unfortunately, without primary data collection and cooperation from state and federal 
sources, the development of these datasets will be difficult.   
Recommendations and Conclusions  
Comparing the drops for respective damage levels across each area, it is clear that vacation areas 
experienced greater damage, and these areas don’t bounce back as quickly as year-round 
residential areas.  Overall, findings of this study suggest that housing recovery policy for places 
with a tourist-based economy, with large seasonal submarkets, should take into account the 
differences in the nature of the decisions to repair and rebuild between owners of year-round and 
seasonal homes. Recovery assistance programs for such communities would also benefit from 
allocating a wider range and higher levels of resources and financing options to support repairs 
and rebuilding for seasonal, second, and occasional housing. Considering disparate decisions and 
making resources available are particularly important in order to support recovery of seasonal 
homes with higher levels of damage in vacation areas because they present very slow recovery 
trajectories which can hold back recovery of the local economy as well. 
Indeed, relatively lower levels of damage among single-family houses in the island vacation areas 
that were built with stronger building codes demonstrates the effectiveness of mitigation for 
accelerating recovery. Had damage levels been as high in the island vacation areas, Galveston’s 
tourist based economy would have been truly devastated, and the slow recovery it experienced 
may not have happened at all. The overall consequences of damage for recovery across all areas, 
particularly in the vacation markets where recovery resources are more limited, drives home the 
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need for coastal communities to reduce damage and enhance resilience through stronger building 
codes, ensuring properties are properly elevated, and enhancing free-board requirements. 
The recovery differentials observed between owner-occupied and renter-occupied homes in both 
year-round and vacation areas are clearly consistent with observations first highlighted by Comerio 
(1997, 1998) and more recently acknowledged by FEMA (2009 and 2011) that our nation’s 
recovery policies focus on owner-occupied housing and neglect rental housing. The authors must 
add to these failures in single-family rental housing, the delays and recovery failures for multi-
family rental housing in general (Bolin and Stratford 1998; Peacock Dash and Zhang 2006; 
Peacock et al., 2017) and in Galveston following Hurricane Ike (White 2010; Hamideh 2015). 
Clearly, our nation needs to grapple with the problem of rental housing recovery. Recent changes 
and added flexibility to HUD’s CDBG-Recovery funding (Olshansky and Johnson, 2014) may 
provide an opportunity for local communities to work with HUD to put into place funding 
mechanisms that might potentially address part of this issue.  
The negative relationship between income and impact and the positive relationship between 
income and recovery we found in traditional residential areas highlight a need for income-targeted 
housing recovery assistance in areas where year-round residents are the majority in order to address 
the needs of lower income households anticipated by our results. However, income may not be the 
most effective recovery resource allocation standard for supporting recovery in vacation areas 
based on their widely different and unexpected impact and recovery patterns observed with respect 
to income. 
References  
Adair, A. S., Berry, J. N., & McGreal, W. S. (1996). Hedonic modeling, housing submarkets and 
residential valuation. Journal of Property Research, 13:67-83. 
37 
 
Aldrich, D. P. (2012) Building Resilience: Social Capital in Post-Disaster Recovery. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
 Aldrich, D.P. and Meyer, M.A. (2015) Social Capital and Community Resilience. American 
Behavioral Scientist 59(2):245-269. 
Angelou-Economics. (2008). Galveston Island Tourism Economic Impact Analysis: Angelou 
Economics. 
Bates, L. K. (2006). Does neighborhood really matter?: comparing historically defined 
neighborhood boundaries with housing submarkets. Journal of Planning Education and 
Research, 26:5-17. 
Bates, L., & Green, R. (2009). Housing Recovery in the Ninth Ward: Disparities in Policy, 
Process, and Prospects. Race, Place, and Environmental Justice after Hurricane Katrina. R. 
Bullard, ed., Westview Press, Boulder, CO, 229-245. 
Beeton, E. (2008). Ike's Lessons: Galveston's land-use decisions exposed by storm's wrath. In T. 
Curtis (Ed.). The Austin Chronicle. (Reprinted from: 1/22/2014). 
Berry, J., McGreal, S., Stevenson, S., Young, J., & Webb, J. R. (2003) Estimation of apartment 
submarkets in Dublin, Ireland, Journal of Real Estate Research, 25(2):159–170. 
Bin, O., & Kruse, J. B. (2006). Real estate market responses to coastal flood hazards. Natural 
Hazards Review, 7(4), 137–144. doi:10.1061/(ASCE)1527-6988(2006)7:4(137) 
Bolin, R. C., & Stanford, L. (1998). The Northridge earthquake: Community-based approaches 
to unmet recovery needs. Disasters, 22(1), 21-38.  
Bolin, R. C. (1982). Long-term family recovery from disaster. Boulder: Institute of Behavioral 
Science, University of Colorado. 
38 
 
Bolin, R. C. (1985). Disasters and long-term recovery policy: A focus on housing and families. 
Policy Studies Review, 4, 709-715.  
Bolin, R. C., & Bolton, P. A. (1983). Recovery in Nicaragua and the USA. International Journal 
of Mass Emergencies and Disasters, 1(1), 125–144.  
Bolin, R. C., & Bolton, P. A. (1986). Race, religion, and ethnicity in disaster recovery. Natural 
Hazard Center Collection. FMHI Publications. Institute of Behavioral Science, University of 
Colorado.  
Bolin, R. C., & Stanford, L. (1991). Shelter, Housing, and Recovery: A comparison of United 
Stated disasters. Disasters, 15(1), 24-34. doi:10.1111/j.1467-7717.1991.tb00424.x 
Bolin, R. C., & Stanford, L. (1998). The Northridge Earthquake: Vulnerability and Disaster. 
New York, NY: Routledge. 
Bourassa, S. C., Hamelink, F., Hoesli, M., & MacGregor, B. D. (1999). Defining housing 
submarkets. Journal of Housing Economics, 8, 160-183. 
Bourassa, S. C., Hoesli, M., & Peng, V. S. (2003). Do housing submarkets really matters? 
Journal of Housing Economics, 12:12-28. 
Cantrell, R., Nahmens, I., Peavey, J., Bryant, K., & Stair, M. (2012). Pre-Disaster Planning for 
Permanent Housing Recovery. Retrieved from 
https://www.huduser.gov/portal/publications/pre_disasterplanning.html 
Chang, S. E. (2010). Urban disaster recovery: A measurement framework and its application to 
the 1995 Kobe earthquake. Disasters, 34(2), 303-327. doi:10.1111/j.1467-7717.2009.01130.x 
Comerio, M. C. (1997). Housing issues after disasters. Journal of Contingencies and Crisis 
Management, 5(3), 166-178.  
39 
 
Comerio, M. (1998). Disaster hits home: new policy for urban housing recovery. Berkeley: 
University of California Press. 
Comerio, M. (2014). Housing Recovery Lessons from Chile. Journal of the American Planning 
Association, 80(4), 340-350.  
Cutter, S. L. (1996). Vulnerability to environmental hazards. Progress in Human Geography, 
20(4), 529-539.  
Cutter, S. L., Schumann, R. L., & Emrich, C. T. (2014). Exposure, Social Vulnerability and 
Recovery Disparities in New Jersey after Hurricane Sandy. Journal of Extreme Events, 01(01), 
1450002. doi:10.1142/S234573761450002X 
De Silva, D., Kruse, J., & Wang, Y.(2006). Catastrophe-induced destruction and reconstruction. 
Natural Hazards Review, 7(1), 19–25. doi:10.1061/(ASCE)1527-6988 (2006)7:1(19) 
Drabek, T. E., & Key, W. H. (1984). Conquering disaster: Family recovery and long-term 
consequences. New York, NY: Irvington. 
Elliott, J. R., Hite, A. B., & Devine, J. A. (2009). Unequal return: The uneven resettlements of 
New Orleans' uptown neighborhoods. Organization and Environment, 22(4), 410-421. 
doi:10.1177/1086026609347184 
Elliott, J. R., & Pais, J. (2006). Race, class, and Hurricane Katrina: Social differences in human 
responses to disaster. Social Science Research, 35(2), 295-321. 
doi:10.1016/j.ssresearch.2006.02.003 
Federal Emergency Management Agency [FEMA], (2008). Hurricane Ike Impact Report. 
FEMA, (2009). National Disaster Housing Strategy. Retrieved from 
http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1819-25045-9288/ndhs_core.pdf 
40 
 
FEMA, (2011). National Disaster Housing Strategy. Retrieved from 
http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1819-25045-9288/ndhs_core.pdf  
FEMA, (2017). Assistance to Individuals and Households. https://www.fema.gov/recovery-
directorate/assistance-individuals-and-households [February 10, 2017]. 
Flanagan, B., Gregory, E., Hallisey, E., Heitgerd, J., & Lewis, B. (2011). A Social Vulnerability 
Index for Disaster Management. Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management, 
8(1).  
Fujita, M.(1989). Urban economic theory: Land use and city size. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511625862 
Glaser,G. (1996) William Grisby and the Analysis of Housing Submarkets and Filtering. Urban 
Studies, 33(10):1797-1805.  
Gotham, K. F. (2014a). Racialization and rescaling: Post-Katrina rebuilding and the Louisiana 
road home program. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 38(3), 773-790. 
doi:10.1111/1468-2427.12141 
Goodman, A. C., & Thibodeau, T. G. (2003). Housing market segmentation and hedonic 
prediction accuracy. Journal of Housing Economics, 12:181-201. 
Goodman, A. C., & Thibodeau, T. G. (2007). The spatial proximity of metropolitan area housing 
submarkets. Real Estate Economics, 35(2):209-232. 
Gotham, K. F. (2014). Reinforcing Inequalities: The Impact of the CDBG Program on Post-
Katrina Rebuilding. Housing Policy Debate, 24(1), 192-212. 
doi:10.1080/10511482.2013.840666 
41 
 
Green, R., Bates, L. K., & Smyth, A. (2007). Impediments to recovery in New Orleans' upper 
and lower ninth ward: One year after Hurricane Katrina. Disasters, 31(4), 311-335. 
doi:10.1111/j.1467-7717.2007.01011.x 
Green, R., Kouassi, M., & Mambo, B. (2013). Housing, Race, and Recovery from Hurricane 
Katrina. Review of Black Political Economy, 40(2), 145-163. doi:10.1007/s12114-011-9116-0 
Green, T. F., & Olshansky, R. B. (2012). Rebuilding housing in New Orleans: The Road Home 
Program after the Hurricane Katrina disaster. Housing Policy Debate, 22(1), 75-99. 
doi:10.1080/10511482.2011.624530 
Grigsby, W.G. (1963) Housing Markets and Pubic Policy. Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press.  
Gulf & South Atlantic Fisheries Foundation, I. (2010). Development of Social Indicators for 
Fishing Communities of the Southeast: Measures of Dependence, Vulnerability, Resilience, and 
Gentrification. 
Hamideh, S. (2015). Planning for Disaster Recovery: Lessons from Hurricane Ike for Theory and 
Practice. PhD dissertation, Department of Landscape Architecture and Urban Planning, Texas 
A&M University. 
Highfield, W., Peacock, W. G., & Van Zandt, S. (2014). Mitigation Planning: Why Hazard 
Exposure, Structural Vulnerability, and Social Vulnerability Matter. Journal of Planning 
Education and Research. doi:10.1177/0739456x14531828 
Housing and Urban Development [HUD]. (2017). Community Development Block Grant 
Disaster Recovery Program. https://www.hudexchange.info/programs/cdbg-dr/ [February 8, 
2017]. 
42 
 
Kamel, N. (2012). The actualization of neoliberal space and the loss of housing affordability in 
Santa Monica, California. Geoforum, 43(3), 453-463. doi:10.1016/j.geoforum.2011.10.005 
Kamel, N., & Loukaitou Sideris, A. (2004). Residential assistance and recovery following the 
Northridge earthquake. Urban Studies, 41(3), 533-562. doi:10.1080/0042098042000178672 
Knaap, G. (1998). The determinants of residential property values: Implications for regional 
planning. Journal of Planning Literature, 12(3), 267–282. doi:10.1177/088541229801200301 
Leishman, C., Costello, G., Rowley, S. & Watkins, C. (2013) The Predictive Performance of 
Multi-level Models of Housing Submarkets: A Comparative Analysis. Urban Studies, 50(6) 
1201-1220. doi:10.1177/0042098012466603 
Lindell, M. K., & Prater, C. (2003). Assessing Community Impacts of Natural Disasters. Natural 
Hazards Review, 4(4), 176-185. doi:10.1061/(ASCE)1527-6988(2003)4:4(176) 
Lowe, J. S. (2012). Policy versus politics: Post-Hurricane Katrina lower-income housing 
restoration in Mississippi. Housing Policy Debate, 22(1), 57-73. 
doi:10.1080/10511482.2011.624529 
Lu, J.C., Peacock, W.G., Zhang, Y. & Dash, N. (2007a) A Comparative Study of Single-family 
and Multi-Family Housing Recovery Following 1992 Hurricane Andrew in Miami-Dade County, 
Florida. Pp 22-26, Proceedings of the Hazards and Disasters Researchers Meeting, Boulder, 
Colorado, July 11-12.  
Lu, J.C., Peacock, W.G., Zhang, Y. & Dash, N. (2007b). Long-Term Housing Recovery: Does 
type really make a difference? Pp 1-8, Proceedings of 2nd International Conference on Urban 
Disaster Reduction, Taipei, Taiwan, November 27-29, 2007.  
Maclennan, D. (1982) Housing Economics: An Applied Approach. London: Longman. 
43 
 
Maly, E., & Shiozaki, Y. (2012). Towards a policy that supports people-centered housing 
recovery—learning from housing reconstruction after the Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake in Kobe, 
Japan. International Journal of Disaster Risk Science, 3(1), 56-65. doi:10.1007/s13753-012-
0007-1 
Megbolugbe, I.F., Hoek-Smit, M. C. and Linneman, P.D. (1996). Understanding Neighborhood 
Dynamics: A review of the Contributions of William G. Grigsby. Urban Studies, 33(10) 1779-
1795. 
Morrow, B. H., & Enarson, E. (1997). A gendered perceptive: The voices of women. In W. G. 
Peacock, B. H. Morrow, & H. Gladwin, Hurricane Andrew: Ethnicity, Gender and the Sociology 
of Disasters (pp. 116–140). London, UK: Routledge.  
Morrow, B. H., & Peacock, W. G. (1997). Disasters and Social Change: Hurricane Andrew and 
the Reshaping of Miami. In W. G. Peacock, B. H. Morrow & H. Gladwin, Hurricane Andrew: 
Ethnicity, Gender and the Sociology of Disasters. London, UK: Routledge.  
NOAA. (2013). DATA DESCRIPTION. Spatial Trends in Coastal Socioeconomics (STICS): 
Coastal County Definitions.  
Olshansky, R., Hopkins, L. D., & Johnson, L. A. (2012). Disaster and Recovery: Processes 
Compressed in Time. Natural Hazards Review, 13(3), 173-178. doi:10.1061/(ASCE)NH.1527-
6996.0000077 
Olshansky, R. B., & Johnson, L. A. (2014). The evolution of the federal role in supporting 
community recovery after U.S. disasters. Journal of the American Planning Association, 80(4), 
293-304. doi:10.1080/01944363.2014.967710 
Palm, R. (1978). Spatial segmentation of the urban housing market. Economic Geography, 54(3), 
210-221. 
44 
 
Peacock, W.G., Dash, N. & Zhang, Y. (2006). Shelter and Housing Recovery following Disaster. 
In H. Rodriguez, E.L. Quarantelli, and R.R. Dynes (Eds.) The Handbook of Disaster Research 
(pp. 258-274). New York: Springer. 
Peacock, W.G., Dash, N., Zhang, Y., & Van Zandt, S. (2017, forthcoming). Post-Disaster 
Sheltering, Temporary Housing and Permanent Housing Recovery. In H. Rodriguez, W. Donner, 
and J.E. Trainor (Eds.) The Handbook of Disaster Research. New York: Springer. 
Peacock, W. G., & Girard, C. (1997). Ethnic and Racial Inequalities in Hurricane Damage and 
Insurance Settlements. In W. G. Peacock, B. H. Morrow & H. Gladwin. (Eds.), Hurricane 
Andrew: Ethnicity, Gender and the Sociology of Disasters (pp. 171-190). London, UK: 
Routledge.  
Peacock, W. G., & Ragsdale, A. K. (1997). Social Systems, Ecological Networks and Disasters. 
Hurricane Andrew: Ethnicity, Gender and the Sociology of Disasters. In W. G. Peacock, B. H. 
Morrow & H. Gladwin. (Eds.), Hurricane Andrew: Ethnicity, Gender and the Sociology of 
Disasters. London, UK: Routledge.  
Peacock, W. G., Van Zandt, S., Zhang, Y., & Highfield, W. (2014). Inequities in Long-Term 
Housing Recovery after Disasters. Journal of the American Planning Association, 80(4), 356-
371.  
Peacock, W. G., Kunreuther, H., Hooke, W.H., Cutter, S.L., Chang, S.E., and Berke, P.R. 
(2008). Toward a Resiliency and Vulnerability Observatory Network: RAVON. Final Report 
NSF Grant SES-08311115. Hazard Reduction and Recovery Center, Texas A&M University. 
http://hrrc.arch.tamu.edu/media/cms_page_media/558/RAVON.pdf 
Quarantelli, E. L. (1982). General and particular observations on sheltering and housing in 
American disasters. Disasters, 6(4): 277–281. doi:10.1111/j.1467-7717.1982.tb00550.x 
45 
 
Rothenberg, J., Galster, G. C., Butler, R. V., & Pitkin, J. (1991). The Maze of Urban Housing 
Markets: Theory, Evidence, and Policy. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press. 
Scales, A.F. (2006) A nation of Policy Holders: Governmental and market failure in flood 
insurance. Mississippi College Law Review 26:7-15.  
Schnare, A., & Struyk, R. (1976). Segmentation in urban housing markets. Journal of Urban 
Economics, (3):146-166. 
Small Business Administration [SBA] (2017a) Types of Disaster Loans.  
https://www.sba.gov/loans-grants/see-what-sba-offers/sba-loan-programs/disaster-loans/types-
disaster-loans [February 10, 2017]. 
Small Business Administration [SBA] (2017b) Home and Personal Property Loans. 
https://www.sba.gov/loans-grants/see-what-sba-offers/sba-loan-programs/disaster-loans/types-
disaster-loans/home-and-personal-property-loans [February 10, 2017]. 
Small Business Administration [SBA] (2017c) Business Physical Disaster Loans. 
http://www.sba.gov/content/home-and-personal-property-loans [February 10, 2017]. 
Smith, G. (2011). Planning for Post-Disaster Recovery: A Review of the United States Disaster 
Assistance Framework (Vol. 1). Fairfax, VA: Public Entity Risk Institute. 
Stevenson, J. R., Emrich, C. T., Mitchell, J. T., & Cutter, S. L. (2010). Using building permits to 
monitor disaster recovery: A spatio-temporal case study of coastal Mississippi following 
Hurricane Katrina. Cartography and Geographic Information Science, 37(1), 57-68. 
doi:10.1559/152304010790588052 
Tu, Y. (1997). The local housing submarket structure and its properties. Urban Studies, 
34(2):337-353. 
46 
 
Van Zandt, S. and M. Sloan. 2016. The Texas Experience with 2008’s Hurricanes Dolly and Ike. 
In A. Sapat& A.M. Esnard (Eds.) Coming Home after Disaster: Multiple Dimensions of Housing 
Recovery (83-98). New York: Routledge. 
Van Zandt, S., Peacock, W. G., Henry, D. W., Grover, H., Highfield, W., & Brody, S. D. (2012). 
Mapping social vulnerability to enhance housing and neighborhood resilience. Housing Policy 
Debate, 22(1), 29-55. doi:10.1080/10511482.2011.624528 
Watkins, C. (2008) Microeconomic perspectives on the structure and operation of local housing 
markets, Housing Studies, 23:163–178. 
Watkins, C. (2001). The definition and identification of housing submarkets. Environment and 
Planning A, 33:2235-2253. 
White, S. (2010), Redevelopment Opportunities from Involuntary Demolition: Galveston Public 
Housing Post Hurricane Ike. College Station, TX: Hazard Reduction and Recovery Center, 
Texas A&M University. 
Zhang, Y. (2012). Will natural disasters accelerate neighborhood decline? A discrete-time hazard 
analysis of residential property vacancy and abandonment before and after Hurricane Andrew in 
Miami-Dade County (1991-2000). Environment and Planning B: Planning and Design, 39(6), 
1084-1104. doi:10.1068/b37121 
Zhang, Y., & Peacock, W. G. (2010). Planning for Housing Recovery? Lessons Learned From 
Hurricane Andrew. Journal of the American Planning Association, 76(1), 5-24. 
doi:10.1080/01944360903294556 
 
Figure Captions 
Figure 1. Vacation homes by census tract  
47 
 
Figure 2. Impact-Recovery Trajectories by Damage Levels 
Figure 3. Damage-Recovery Trajectories for Owner-Occupied vs. Other Single Family Housing 
Figure 4. Impact-Recovery Trajectories by Neighborhood Median Household Income 
Figure 5. Impact-Recovery Trajectories by Neighborhood Hispanic Composition 
Figure 6. Impact-Recovery Trajectories by Neighborhood non-Hispanic Black Composition 
 
Table 1. Weighted Housing Unit Characteristics for Galveston: Residential and 
Seasonal/Vacation Housing Markets 
Housing submarkets 
Percent Total Housing Units 
Percent Vacant 
for Seasonal, 
Recreational, or 
Occasional Use 
Percent of Housing Units built 
Owner-
occupied 
Renter-
Occupied Vacant 
After 
1990 
1980-
1989 
1979-
1950 
Before 
1950 
Residential market 
Urban Core 33.3 41.9 24.9 16.8 7.5 14.5 41.7 36.3 
Seasonal vacation market 
Galveston Island 30.0 15.4 54.6 72.1 24.0 25.8 43.9 6.3 
Bolivar Peninsula 22.8 7.5 69.8 79.2 7.6 20.2 60.8 11.4 
Total 31.6 33.8 34.6 45.5 10.2 17.0 32.5 40.4 
*Estimated housing units: Bolivar 4,408 (10.8%), Island Vacation 6,587 (16.2%), Urban Core 29,655 (73.0%); 
 Number of census tracts: Urban Core 19, Bolivar 1, Island 3. Data from 2005-2009 American Community Survey. 
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics for variables in the panel models 
Variable  Description  Data source Urban 
Core 
Island 
Vacation 
Bolivar 
Vacation 
Mean 
 (SD) 
Mean 
 (SD) 
Mean 
 (SD) 
Ln(AV)base Natural log of base year assessed value, 
2008 
Tax appraisal 11.2137    
(.7025) 
11.8381  
(.6831) 
10.9802    
(.8884) 
Ln(AV)yr1 Natural log, assessed value yr. 1 after 
Ike 2009 
10.6366    
(1.3996) 
11.3690   
(1.7031) 
3.9812    
(5.1174) 
Ln(BV)yr2 Natural log, assessed value yr. 2 after 
Ike, 2010 
10.9662    
(1.5793) 
11.5296    
(1.9169) 
4.2758    
(5.3371) 
Ln(BV)yr3 Natural log, assessed value yr. 3 after 
Ike, 2011 
10.9730    
(1.6396) 
11.4871    
(2.1443) 
5.0478    
(5.5561) 
Ln(BV)yr4 Natural log, assessed value yr. 4 after 
Ike, 2012 
10.9715    
(1.6734) 
11.5239    
(2.1799) 
5.5763    
(5.6970) 
Ln(BV)yr5 Natural log, assessed value yr. 5 after 
Ike, 2013 
10.9849    
(1.7068) 
11.5742    
(2.1931) 
5.9686    
(5.7221) 
Ln(BV)yr6 Natural log, assessed value yr. 6 after 
Ike, 2014 
11.0114     
(1.7532) 
11.6209    
(2.2051) 
6.1917     
(5.7299) 
Ln(BV)yr7 Natural log, assessed value yr. 7 after 
Ike, 2015 
11.1475    
(1.8065) 
11.7857    
(2.2414) 
6.5417    
(5.7748) 
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Age  Home’s age base year  Tax appraisal 31.9942    
(9.8310) 
17.6676    
(9.6041) 
21.3004    
(11.4060) 
SqM  Square meter  146.5797    
(72.2258) 
148.2564    
(70.4632) 
107.2301    
(51.3671) 
Own  Owner: 1 = owner-occupied, 
 0 = otherwise. 
Tax appraisal .5827    
(.4931) 
.2943    
(.4558) 
.2266    
(.4186) 
Dmg  Percentage appraised value lost Tax appraisal 33.4007    
(24.2568) 
22.5529    
(20.3498) 
72.8360    
(43.6046) 
Inc  Median household income  
(in thousands) 
American 
Community 
Survey block 
group 
38.6572     
(17.9067) 
56.7119    
(12.0134) 
33.2716    
(1.3517) 
Hisp  Percent Hispanic 31.4043    
(18.3886) 
7.2020    
(4.6217) 
5.3638    
(7.0922) 
Blk  Percentage non-Hispanic Black 18.4410    
(18.6648) 
1.9997    
(7.1034) 
0 
(0) 
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Table 3. Panel Models for Each Submarket 
Variables 
Intercept 
Urban core Island Vacation Bolivar Vacation 
10.7050** 11.1225** 11.6545** 11.4186** 28.6760** 13.2943** 
Year indicator 
dummies 
Post-Ike yr. 1 0.1499** 0.1594** 0.8958** 0.9401** 0.4339** 10.2140** 
Post-Ike yr. 2 0.5187** 0.0410 ns 1.0809** 1.1492** 0.8908** 13.7261** 
Post-Ike yr. 3 0.5438** -0.0056 ns 1.0577** 1.3779** 1.7420** 17.9190** 
Post-Ike yr. 4 0.5666** 0.0330 ns 1.1111** 1.3337** 2.3420** 20.9837** 
Post-Ike yr. 5 0.6018** 0.0274 ns 1.1839** 1.5847** 2.8057** 23.8607** 
Post-Ike yr. 6 0.6517** 0.0443 ns 1.2483** 1.6298** 3.0890** 24.7039** 
Post-Ike yr. 7 0.8113** 0.2443** 1.4327** 1.8109** 3.4489** 25.7894** 
House 
characteristics 
Age -0.0203** -0.0202** -0.0189** -0.0180** -0.0515** -0.0525** 
Square meter  0.0053** 0.0053** 0.0054** 0.0054** 0.0051** 0.0053** 
Damage and 
damage-year 
dummy 
interactions 
Damage -0.0209** -0.0324** -0.0584** -0.0573** -0.1011** -0.1231** 
Damage×yr.2  - 0.0106** - -0.0007ns - 0.0070** 
Damage×yr.3 - 0.0110** - -0.0060* - 0.0192** 
Damage×yr.4 - 0.0127** - -0.0055@ - 0.0269** 
Damage×yr.5 - 0.0136** - -0.0023ns - 0.0337** 
Damage×yr.6 - 0.0147** - -0.0030ns - 0.0375** 
Damage×yr.7 - 0.0147** - -0.0028ns - 0.0414** 
Owner-occupied 
and Owner-year 
dummy 
interactions 
Owner occ. 0.2605** 0.1366** 0.0221ns -0.0692** 0.2262* 0.0783** 
Owner×yr.1  - 0.0678** - 0.1136** - 0.0698ns 
Owner×yr.2  - 0.1085** - 0.0706* - 0.0219ns 
Owner×yr.3  - 0.1349** - 0.1411** - -0.0304ns 
Owner×yr.4  - 0.1509** - 0.0856* - 0.2734@ 
Owner×yr.5  - 0.1674** - 0.0824@ - 0.2446@ 
Owner×yr.6  - 0.1886** - 0.1015* - 0.3691* 
Owner×yr.7  - 0.1747** - 0.1003* - 0.3532* 
Median Household 
income and 
Median Income-
year interactions 
Med.H.H.Inc. 0.0067** 0.0025** -0.0087** -0.0004ns -0.5084** -0.0492** 
Med.Inc.×yr.1  - 0.0034** - -0.0053** - -0.2505** 
Med.Inc.×yr.2  - 0.0048** - -0.0072** - -0.3538** 
Med.Inc.×yr.3  - 0.0058** - -0.0098** - -0.4767** 
Med.Inc.×yr.4  - 0.0051** - -0.0087** - -0.5667** 
Med.Inc.×yr.5  - 0.0050** - -0.0116** - -0.6519** 
Med.Inc.×yr.6  - 0.0052** - -0.0112** - -0.6766** 
Med.Inc.×yr.7  - 0.0046** - -0.0109** - -0.7050** 
Percent Hispanic 
and Percent 
Hispanic-year 
interactions 
%Hispanic -0.0015** -0.0044** 0.0385** 0.0006ns -0.0345** -0.0081** 
%Hisp×yr.1  - 0.0030** - 0.0334** - 0.0411** 
%Hisp.×yr.2  - 0.0036** - 0.0507** - 0.0153* 
%Hisp.×yr 3  - 0.0038** - 0.0510** - -0.0159* 
%Hisp.×yr.4  - 0.0031** - 0.0508** - -0.0384** 
%Hisp.×yr.5  - 0.0035** - 0.0447** - -0.0549** 
%Hisp.×yr.6  - 0.0031** - 0.0464** - -0.0655** 
%Hisp.×yr.7 - 0.0031** - 0.0437** - -0.0701** 
Neighborhood % 
non-Hispanic 
Black 
%N-Hisp. Blk -0.0009ns -0.0060** -0.0390** -0.0115** - - 
%N.H.B.×yr.1 - 0.0062** - -0.0221** - - 
%N.H.B.×yr.2 - 0.0078** - -0.0307** - - 
%N.H.B.×yr.3 - 0.0076** - -0.0323** - - 
%N.H.B.×yr.4 - 0.0057** - -0.0355** - - 
%N.H.B.×yr.5 - 0.0052** - -0.0348** - - 
%N.H.B.×yr.6 - 0.0045** - -0.0366** - - 
%N.H.B.×yr.7 - 0.0042** - -0.0375** - - 
 R2 within 0.0857 0.1063 0.1809 0.1923 0.4980 0.5295 
R2 between 0.3137 0.3137 0.4618 0.4619 0.6058 0.6060 
R2 overall 0.2591 0.2641 0.4014 0.4038 0.5655 0.5774 
Note: urban core: n=97,888 in 12,236 groups; Island Vacation: n=48,264 in 6,033 groups; Bolivar Vacation: n=40,128 in 5,016 groups. Test for 
heterogeneous effects: urban core: 546.09**, Island vacation: 367.74**, and Bolivar vacation: 1548.94**; ns: not statistically significant; two-
tailed probabilities: * p ≤ .05, ** p ≤ .01; one-tailed: @p ≤ .05. 
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Table 4. Summary of Findings with Respect to Hypotheses 
Hypotheses Urban Core Island Vacation Bolivar Vacation 
H1: Higher degrees of damage will slow 
recovery 
Supported: -3.2% per 
percentage loss initially 
and -1.8% by 2015 
Supported: -5.7% per 
percentage loss initially, 
remains constant 
Supported: -12.3% per 
percentage loss initially and 
still -7.9% by 2015  
H2: Owner-occupied housing will suffer 
less damage. 
Supported: owner 
occupied retained more 
(+7%) of its pre-Ike value. 
Supported: owner occupied 
retained more (+12%) of its 
pre-Ike value. 
Rejected: owner occupied 
retains baseline edge, but did 
not suffer less damage. 
H3: Owner occupied housing will 
recover more quickly. 
Supported: owner 
occupied housing 
consistently recovers more 
quickly, finishing +36.5% 
above 
Supported, marginally: 
owner occupied housing 
recover more quickly a year 
or two afterward but gains 
dissolved later in the 
recovery period 
Supported: owner occupied 
housing makes consistent 
gains after 2011, finishing 
+54% above. 
H4: Housing in higher income 
neighborhoods will suffer less damage. 
Supported: housing in 
higher income 
neighborhoods suffered 
less damage 
Rejected: housing in higher 
income neighborhoods 
suffered higher damage 
levels  
Rejected: housing in higher 
income neighborhoods 
suffered higher damage levels 
H5: Housing in higher income 
neighborhoods will recovery more 
quickly 
Supported: housing in 
higher income areas 
recovered more quickly 
Rejected: housing in higher 
income neighborhoods 
recovered more slowly 
Rejected: housing in higher 
income neighborhoods 
recovered more slowly 
H6a: Housing in neighborhoods with 
higher Hispanic concentrations will 
suffer more damage  
Rejected: housing in 
neighborhoods with higher 
Hispanic concentrations 
did not suffer relatively 
higher losses. 
Rejected: housing in 
neighborhoods with higher 
Hispanic concentrations did 
not suffer relatively higher 
losses. 
Rejected: housing in 
neighborhoods with higher 
Hispanic concentrations did 
not suffer relatively higher 
losses. 
H7a: Housing in neighborhoods with 
higher Hispanic concentrations will 
recover more slowly. 
Rejected: housing in 
neighborhoods with higher 
Hispanic concentrations 
made net gains, but total 
assessed values were still 
lower. 
Rejected: housing in 
neighborhoods with higher 
Hispanic concentrations 
made relative gains during 
the recovery period. 
Supported: by 2010 housing 
in neighborhoods with higher 
Hispanic concentrations were 
consistently slower to recover 
and fell further behind 
H6b: Housing in neighborhoods with 
higher non-Hispanic Black 
concentrations will suffer more damage 
Rejected: housing in 
neighborhoods with higher 
non-Hispanic Black 
concentrations did not 
suffer relatively higher 
losses. 
Supported: housing in 
neighborhoods with higher 
non-Hispanic Black 
concentrations suffered 
relatively higher losses. 
Not applicable: There is no 
non-Hispanic Black 
population on Bolivar. 
H7b: Housing in neighborhoods with 
higher non-Hispanic Black 
concentrations will recover more slowly. 
Rejected: housing in 
neighborhoods with higher 
non-Hispanic Black 
concentrations made net 
gains zeroing out 
differential assessments.  
Supported: housing in 
neighborhoods with higher 
non-Hispanic Black 
concentrations consistently 
recovered a significantly 
lower rates. 
Not applicable: There is no 
non-Hispanic Black 
population on Bolivar. 
 
